Heath Haussamen
Doña Ana County released proposed agreements late Monday that would formalize commitments the developers of Project Jupiter are making in exchange for tax breaks.
County commissioners are scheduled to vote on the agreements at a public meeting on Friday.
Folks, I’ve been working on a separate article on the county’s non-disclosure agreements with the developers, which the county gave me today, but that’s going to have to wait. My next task will be reading and writing about what is in these proposed agreements. And then I’ll get back to the NDAs.
In the meantime, I want you to have these agreements as soon as possible, given how quickly this is moving and how much there is to sort through.
Read the proposed agreements by clicking here. This is the entire packet for Friday’s meeting; the Project Jupiter documents begin on page 169.
A County agenda, indeed, for all times, one that surpasses “normal” imagination. I’m glad the County Council set aside in its agenda a “little” time for “deciding,” after presumably carefully studying a 531-page document, and whatever else it has done to this point in considering the massiveness and impacts of this pretentiously dubbed “Project Jupiter,” whether or not to support a $165 billion project. Yes, billions. And are non-disclosure agreements the new “pass go” cards? As a former elected official from back East, I think there is much here that would be considered laughable. I would never sign an “NDA” as a public official.
I’ll write more about the NDAs soon. Sorry today’s news diverted me from that!
Non-disclosure agreements signed without a public vote, when the bond statutes already establish what’s confidential. It’s tyrannical.
I see no binding legal commitment and no remedies in the “MOU”, so it seems legally irrelevant to whether the Board approves the bonds.
Many of the summary points in the MOU are contained in the LEDA and IRB documents, so as far as I can tell they are legally binding… but then there are some I see in the MOU only and so not binding — most notably the water-use commitment and then grants in the Supplemental Community Investment appendix.
Where are the clawback provisions should the developer fail to create the jobs? Trust me.
Check out page 208!
Thanks, Heath. Found it. Not sure what to make of it, though. The project is supposed to provide for 750 full-time and 50 part-time employees. The clawback language is for a fraction of this:
A. [If the sum of full-time equivalent employees and 50% of part-time employees attributable to the Project is less than (i) [45] on December 31, 20[29], (ii) [75] on December 31, 20[30] and (iii) [75] on December 31, 20[31] (each such date a “Job Target Date”), as set forth in the annual report of the Company to the Issuer pursuant to Section 4.21, and such employment shortfall is not cured prior to February 28 of the calendar year following such Job Target Date (the “Employment Cure Period”), then the Issuer may require an increase to the Company’s PILOT…
Good catch!
I just checked again, and there are also job numbers (700) in the LEDA Public Participation Agreement with potential penalties.
Saw that, but I only see clawbacks related to employment REPORTING, not actual hires. (Also a GRT clawback for not spending enough money on the project. Again, a very low bar.)